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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4692
This paper analyzes the economic growth impact of 
organized political violence. First, the authors articulate 
the theoretical underpinnings of the growth impact of 
political violence in a popular model of growth under 
uncertainty. The authors show that, under plausible 
assumptions regarding attitudes toward risk, the 
overall effects of organized political violence are likely 
to be much higher than its direct capital destruction 
impact. Second, using a quantitative model of violence 
that distinguishes between three levels of political 
violence (riots, coups, and civil war), the authors use 
predicted probabilities of aggregate violence and its 
three manifestations to identify their growth effects 
in an encompassing growth model. Panel regressions 
suggest that organized political violence, especially civil 
war, significantly lowers long-term economic growth.  
Moreover, unlike most previous studies, the authors 
also find ethnic fractionalization to have a negative and 
This paper—a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to analyze the development impact of conflicts. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at ielbadawi@worldbank.org or bodeaana@
msu.edu. 
direct effect on growth, though its effect is substantially 
ameliorated by the institutions specific to a non-factional 
partial democracy. Third, the results show that Sub-
Saharan Africa has been disproportionately impacted 
by civil war, which explains a substantial share of its 
economic decline, including the widening income gap 
relative to East Asia. Civil wars have also been costly for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For the case of Sudan, a typical large 
African country experiencing a long-duration conflict, 
the cost of war amounts to $46 billion (in 2000 fixed 
prices), which is roughly double the country’s current 
stock of external debt. Fourth, the authors suggest that 
to break free from its conflict-underdevelopment trap, 
Africa needs to better manage its ethnic diversity. The 
way to do this would be to develop inclusive, non-
factional democracy. A democratic but factional polity 
would not work, and would be only marginally better 
than an authoritarian regime. 
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Political violence kills human beings, destroys natural resources and wild life, and 
wipes out productive physical capital.  Although such violence is itself endogenous to a 
range of complex factors, once ignited, it can become the direct cause of untold human 
suffering, loss of life as well as massive economic decline and political instability.  There is a 
large body of literature documenting the direct impact of political violence, most notably 
civil wars.  For example, out of 30 major conflicts recorded in 2000, there were 23 civil wars, 
of which ten were in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  These wars are estimated to have resulted in 
over four million deaths and have cost the countries in question more than $138 billion (in 
1995 prices).
1  Battle-related deaths declined precipitously between 1942 and 2002, where 
nearly 700,000 people were killed in the wars of 1950 compared to 20,000 in 2002
2.  Still, the 
toll in terms of loss of human life is high, especially if we account for the multiple lives lost 
by the indirect causes of wars, such as disease and starvation.  Moreover, between 1980 and 
1992 the total number of displaced people as a result of wars was estimated to have risen 
from 16 million to more than 40 million.   In terms of the regional distribution of political 
violence, the largest number of battle deaths were registered in East Asia, Southeast Asia and 
Oceania during the period up to the 1970s; then in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Central and South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s; and by the turn of the 21
st 
century, Sub-Saharan Africa has become the most violent region, accounting for more 
battle-related deaths than all other regions combined (Human Security Centre, 2005).    
The evidence on the direct destructive impact of political violence on human, natural 
and physical capital is abundant.  However, the overall, general equilibrium, development 
costs of political violence are, in fact, much larger.  This is particularly true for long-drawn-
out violence, such as civil wars; or short-duration but highly intense violence, such as riots or 
uprisings.  In addition to its direct destructive effect, political violence undermines the 
micro-security of the individual as well as the macro-security of communities, nations and 
countries.  Therefore, it can change behavior, preferences as well as institutions and public 
policy.  For example, it has been argued that the increased mortality associated with violence 
tends to shorten agents’ planning horizon, leading to much heavier than normal discounting 
 
1 Reported in Willett (2001), and based on estimates taken from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ 
report for 2000/2001: IISS (2000).  
2 This decline in the number of casualties is due to changing face of wars, from inter-state wars, fought by 




                                                
of the future.  Such preferences are associated with reduced savings, lower human capital 
accumulation and risky behavior (Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg, 2006).  Worse still, 
protracted violence, such as civil wars, could also reduce trust in society and push it into an 
opportunistic equilibrium, where professional standards and professional ethics suffer and 
the quality of public policy deteriorates (Collier, 1999).  Translated at the macro-institutional 
level, the development course of many countries that experienced civil wars has been one of: 
short-circuited democratic process, including repeated interventions by the military; 
misallocation of physical and human resources towards military activities; disruption of the 
country’s external political and economic relations; general failure to create and implement a 
long-term development vision; and diminished legitimacy of the state.   
Our paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the impact of political violence 
on economic growth for a global sample of developing and developed countries.  We use a 
concept of political violence that accounts for three types of unruly contestation of political 
power: riots; coups; and civil wars.  This index is developed in Bodea and Elbadawi (2007), 
where we estimate a multinomial model of political violence that controls for economic 
variables, quality of political governance, social characteristics as well as proxies for the 
technology of violence.   This work allows the construction of predicted probabilities of 
aggregate political violence and the three sub-components.  The probability estimates are 
used in the current paper as instruments for the onset of political violence in an endogenous 
growth model, which we estimate by a dynamic panel GMM.  The GMM regressions control 
for potential endogeniety, most notably that of political violence; account for country 
heterogeneity; and are robust to standard specification and diagnostic tests.  Our results 
suggest that political violence, especially civil war, has a robust and negative effect on 
growth.  The estimated overall, direct and indirect general equilibrium, growth effect is 
substantially larger than the direct capital depletion/destruction effect
3, normally attributed 
to onset of political violence.  We also find ethnic fractionalization to have a negative direct 
effect on growth, in addition to its indirect effect through political violence and economic 
and political institutions.  Moreover, we find that democracy has had a direct positive effect 
on growth, especially in ethnically fractionalized societies.  Though our results have some 
similarity to earlier ones on the impact of civil war, we will argue, however, that they have 
much more profound implications than just corroborating the evidence from the received 
literature.  They hold in an encompassing model that fully accounts for country 
 




                                                
heterogeneity and potential endogeneity.  Moreover, unlike previous studies we control for 
the relevant types of democracy from the perspective of the developing countries which are 
usually short of fully fledged democracies, but mix democratic and authoritarian features, 
making them only partially democratic.  We find that, relative to autocracies, only a non-
factional as opposed to a fragmented partial democracy has a direct and independent 
positive growth effect.
4   
Section II articulates the theory behind the growth impact of political violence in a 
stylized one-country version of a recent two-country stochastic AK growth model developed 
by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2006).  Abadie and Gardeazabal analyze the impact of terrorism 
in a global world economy.  Our focus will be on deriving steady-state growth and discussing 
the theoretical conditions for a larger general equilibrium impact of political violence on 
growth, well beyond the direct capital destruction effect.  Section III briefly describes the 
model of political violence and the predicted probabilities for three distinct types of violence 
- riots, coup d’etat and civil war.  Section IV estimates a GMM dynamic growth model for 68 
countries over six five-year non-overlapping periods during 1970-99.  The sample is 
dominated by the developing world, which accounts for 52 countries, including 15 from 
SSA.  Though the results of this analysis have global applicability, they also allow us to focus 
on SSA, which has recently become the most conflict-ridden region in the world.  In this 
context, we contribute to the quest for understanding the genesis of Africa's development 
failures, especially the debate on the causes behind the underdevelopment of Africa relative 
to other regions.  First, we simulate the contribution of the risk of civil war to the expanding 
income differential between SSA and East Asia (EA).  Second, we use our empirical 
framework to estimate the cost of civil war for the case of Sudan.  Section V concludes. 
 
4 See for example, Elbadawi and Ndung'u (2005) and Gyimah-Brempong and Corley (2005), who accounts for 
the hazard of civil war in an endogenous, albeit, less encompassing, growth models.   Also see Collier (2000) 
and Easterly (2001 a, b) who analyze the growth impact of social fractionalization, and political and economic 
institutions; and Collier (1999), who estimates the growth effects of civil war, post-conflict and ethnic 
fractionalization in a long-run growth model that abstracts from short-run dynamics and persistent 
endogeniety.  
II.   Economic Growth and Political Violence: A Stylized Model 
We analyze the impact of political violence on economic growth in a stylized growth 
model that assumes stochastic AK technology and accounts for the onset of political 
violence as innovations from a Poisson process, p(t), with parameter  λ .  The onset (arrival) 
of political violence is assumed to destroy a fraction  δ  ( 1 0 ≤ ≤ δ ) of the economy’s capital 
stock k(t).  This model is a specialization of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2006) (hereafter AG) 
two-country model on “terrorism and the world economy”.   The AG model attempts to 
explain the large observed effects of terrorism on the economic performance of a country 
impacted by a terrorist event by accounting for its overall general equilibrium effect through 
the FDI channel in an open global economy.  Instead, this paper uses a one-country version 
of the AG model to analyze the impact of political violence on growth.   Specifically, we 
analyze the effect of the onset of political violence on the steady-state growth.  However, we 
introduce two generalizations to the AG model with regard to the specifications of the AK 
technology and the lifetime discounted utility, where we allow the rate of capital 
accumulation as well as the rate of discount of future consumption to depend on the 
Poisson parameter of the onset of political violence.   
The stochastic AK technology is given by:
5   
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Where y(t) is output, k(t) is aggregate capital stock (both physical and human) and w(t) is a 
Wiener process, whose innovations captures domestic productivity shocks. The negative 
dependence of α on the Poisson parameter suggests that a high probability of war onset 
reduces the efficiency of the economy (in terms of output growth for given level of stock of 
capital).  Accounting for the direct impact of political violence, the return to capital is given 
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This expression implies that the equation of motion for capital accumulation can be written 
as: 





5 As noted by Abadie and Gardeazabal, this specification follows Obstfeld (1994) and Turnovsky (1997) and is 
justified by the findings of McGrattan (1998) and Li (2002), who show that long-run trends in investment and 
growth are consistent with the predictions of the AK model. (3)   dt t c t k t dp t dw dt t c t k t dR t dk ) ( ) ( )} ( ) ( ) ( { ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( − − + = − = δ σ λ α ω   
Where c(t) is consumption.    
Agents are assumed to derive instantaneous utility from consumption through a constant 
relative risk aversion utility: 
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c u c γ , is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative 
risk aversion; also note that at the limit for 1 = γ ,  c c u ln ) ( = . 
 
Now agents choose c(t) to maximize lifetime discounted utility, subject to the law of motion 
governing capital accumulation: 
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= λ β β suggests that agents tend to assign lesser value to future consumption the 
higher the probability of war onset.  
This is the one-country version of the problem analyzed by AG, which gives the 
following one-country version of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation: 
(6)  





































for some function V(k). 
This solves for the corresponding optimum consumption plan for the one-country model: 
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Substituting (7) in (3), we solve for the steady-state rate of growth of the economy: 
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Therefore, like any one-sided risk, the onset of political violence does not only 
reduce the level of growth but it would also increase its volatility.  The latter effect is 
relatively straightforward, where growth volatility is linear in the probability of political 
violence (λ )
6 for a given level of capital stock depreciation (due to political violence:δ ); and 
for a given level of the onset probability, the rate of capital stock depreciation has a positive 
and quadratic effect on growth volatility.  On the other hand, the effect of political violence 
on growth is more nuanced and depends on the degree of the risk aversion parameter (γ ) as 
well as the probability of political violence parameterλ : 
(11)   dt
t k t dk E
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Where 0 / ) ( > ∂ ∂ = ′ λ β λ β , and 0 / ) ( < ∂ ∂ = ′ λ α λ α . 
As stylized as it may be, this model can account for the multiple negative effects of 
political violence on growth, especially those discussed in the civil war literature (Collier, 
1999). First the model captures the destruction of capital effect, reflected by 
dt } ) 1 ( ) 1 {(
1 1 γ δ γδ
γ
− − − + − (the second term of equation 11).  The sign of this effect 
depends on the risk aversion parameterγ , though it is likely to be negative for all plausible 
degrees of risk aversion (see simulations below).  The model also accounts for the disruption 
and diversion channels, which reduces the economy’s productivity. The breakdown of social 
order or the setback to civil liberties associated with political violence reduces the efficiency 
of service delivery and, therefore, disrupts the economy.  Moreover, the realignment of 
political powers during political violence, say from law enforcement institutions to the army 
entails reallocation of resources in favor of the latter, which diverts resources away from the 
key institutions for the enforcement of property rights and micro-security.  These two 
channels are accounted for in the model by the stochastic productivity term of equation 11: 
0 ) (
1
< ′ − dt λ α
γ
.  This channel has a uni ormly negative effect on economic growth. Also, 







6 Strictly speaking, the growth volatility is linear in the intensity of political violence (λ ), however, the 




in response to political violence, including to
heavily discount the future, which would lead to dis-saving.  This effect is accounted for by 
 its effect on mortality, agents are likely to 
the component of equation 11, associated with the consumers’ future discount 
parameter: 0 ) (
1
< ′ − dt λ β
γ
, which also has a uniformly negative effect on growth.
7 
So far, the model can be shown to account for four (the destruction, disruption, 
diversion and dis-saving effects) of five channels identified by Collier (1999).  The final 
portfolio-substitution channel can also be discussed in the context of the model by heuristically 
invoking AG’s two-country framework.    Assume that k is the world capital stock in a two-
economy model (domestic and foreign); and that a fraction θ of the capital stock is owned 
by residents of the domestic economy, which leaves the remaining fraction of  ) 1 ( θ −  for the 
residents of the foreign economy.  Therefore, the stock of wealth owned by the residents of 
the domestic economy is given by: 
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And s  f imilarly for the oreign economy: 
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 the domestic economy is given b
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y 0 ) ( ), ( < ′ = λ λ v v v to , we have a measure of the net 
foreign asset position of the domestic economy given by the foreign holding of domestic 
capital { ) ( . ). 1 ( t k v θ − } minus the domestic holding of foreign capital { ) ( ). 1 .( t k v − θ }.   The 
difference normalized by the amount of productive capital allocated to the domestic 
economy  measure of the stock of net foreign investment (N
(14)  
 ( ) ( . t k v ), is a FInvst): 
) ( 1 λ
θ
v NFInvst − =  
At the onset of political violence net foreign investment in the domestic economy is 
 low-income conflict-affected country (i.e. v < θ ). likely to be positive in the typical    
However, as a result of the violence,  shrinks over time as investors (with low risk aversion) 
                                                
v
 
7 Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2006), for example, argue that a high adult mortality rate, which is one 
form of depletion of the human capital stock associated with political violence, tends to shorten time horizons 
and increase the level of risky behavior which, among other things, reduces investment in physical and human 




divest from the domestic economy in favor of the foreign economy (i.e. higher ) ( ). 1 .( t k v − θ  
for domestic investors and lower ) ( . ). 1 ( t k v θ −  for foreign investors).   This is becaus a 
one-sided risk, political violence offers no trade-offs for investors since it does not only 
decrease the average return to investment but it also increases its variance.    
 
II.1 Illustrative Simulations 
To simplify matters for simulation purposes we specify the efficie
e, as 
cy and future  n
iscount parameters as linear functions of the Poisson parameter: λ β( λ β β 0 00 ) + = ,  d
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We  irect impact of the onset of political violence cau
∂
assume that the d s
 of 1.0% (i.e.
es an annual rate of 
01 . 0 = δ depletion of capital stock ), which is likely to be associated with a civil
war of medium to high intensity o
8.  Given furt
 
her assumptions about the  f violence
combined growth effects of the efficiency and future discount parameters 
( 25 . 0 , 125 . 0 , 05 . 0 , 0 . 0 0 0 = + β α ), the net marginal growth impact of the onset of civil war 
(equation 11’ above) is simulated in Figure 1 for a wide range of values of the risk aversion 
parameter: 20 ,..., 05 . 0 = γ .  Note that when the disruption, diversion and dis-saving channels are 
assumed to be inconsequential (i.e. 0 . 0 0 0 = + β α ), the net growth effect depends crucially 
on the degree of risk aversion.  This can be seen from differentiating equation (7) relative 
toδ : 
(15)  γ δ γ
γ λ
δ ) 1 (




∂ t k t c
= 0, if 0 . 1 = γ 0 . 1 > γ ; >0, if 0 . 1 < γ = ; <0, if    
e bove equation lies behind  in Figure 1, when only the capital stock 
depletion effect of political violence is accounted for.  Under risk neutrality, agents will 
adjust their consumption just eno gh so that the consumption/capi
Th  a  the simulations
u tal ratio remains 
unchanged, which means that the full brunt of the depletion will be reflected in the growth 
rate.  However, risk averse agents ( 0 . 1 > γ ) would disproportionately reduce consumption 
                                                 
8 This rate can be thought of as a mean of the range } 035 . 0 , 005 . 0 { − − ∈ δ , which corresponds to about a 
one and a half standard deviation interval around the point estimate of -0.02 for the growth effect of civil war 
found by Collier (1999).   A value ofδ equal to -0.5% would reflect low intensity civil war or other forms of 
political violence, such as riots or coups; while a high negative value of -3.5% will be associated with civil wars 
of extremely high intensity of violence.    
 (relative to capital stock) at the steady state, which softens the blow (on growth) of the initial 
capital stock depletion.  On the other hand, risk taking agents would reinforce the negative 
depletion effects by raising relative consumption at the steady state.  Thus an initial capital 
stock depletion effect of 1% could lead to a negative marginal growth effect as high as 4% 
under low risk aversion ( 25 . 0 = γ ) to a much lower effect at -0.1% under high risk aversion 
( 0 . 6 = γ ).  When we account for the combined influences of the disruption, diversion and 
dis-saving channels the relationship between risk aversion and the net growth effect will be 
weaker depending on the extent of the indirect effects on growth.  In this case we obtain 
more realistic simulations that accounts for the fuller growth effects of political violence.  
Even a combination of high degree of risk aversion and the modest assumptions about the 
above combined indirect effects (0.05, 0.125, 0.25), generates large net growth effects.   The 
simulated effects are, respectively, -1.5, -3.4, -6.5% for 0 . 4
 
= γ ; and -1.0, -2.2, -4.3% 
for 0 . 6 = γ .   Using these simulations we can assess the appropriateness of the econometric 
estimates of the growth elasticity of civil war abstained in the econometric literature.  For 
example: Assuming capital stock depletion rates of 1.0% per year, Collier’s (1999, Table 1) 
point estimate of the growth elasticity of civil war (-2.2%), based on a pooled OLS 
regression is consistent with a combination of risk aversion and indirect growth effects of 
( 0 . 6 = γ , 125 . 0 0 0 = + β α ); Gyimah-Brempong and Corley’s (2005, Table 5) estimate of -
5.2%, based on a GMM dynamic panel, would approximately correspond to a risk aversion - 
indirect effect combination of (6, 0.25).  According to the latter authors, OLS estimates, 
in   S, are likely to substantially understate the true net effect of civil 
war.  
 









Our main goal in this section is to derive the risk of political violence that is used in 
 growth regressions later on in the paper.  We use the theoretical approach and 
 overall risk of political 
th
estimations from Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) and we generate the
 as well as the risk for three distinct types of political violence: riots, coup d’etat and 
civil war.  From the theoretical model in section II we expect that the onset of political 
violence reduces economic growth.  However, we suspect that the size of the effects differs 
across types of political violence.   
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approaches: macro studies, analyses of survey data and case studies.  The dominant view 
from the recent empirical literature
: A high risk of civil war is robustly associated with low and stagnating income, high 
dependence on natural resources and other insurgency promoting environmental and 
demographic factors - such as high and sparsely dispersed population or rough geographic 
terrain.  On the other hand, factors associated with “grievance motives” – such as 
democracy, ethnic and religious fractionalization, ethnic dominance, ethnic and religions 
polarization - have been marginalized as causes of civil strife.  
Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) reevaluate the effects of grievance factors on the 
occurrence of political violence.   It also embeds the study of civil war in a more general 
analysis of varieties of violent contestation of political power w
ally, other possible manifestations of irregular and violent contestation of poli
power are coups and riots.   Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) use a multinomial logit 
specification, in which the manifestations of violence range from lower intensity armed 
violence to coups and civil wars.  If civil war is just one of the alternative expressions of 
violent contestation of political power, a multinomial model is more appropriate 
of logit or probit models.   Also, a multinomial framework is more appropriate than a 
bivariate model of domestic conflict (civil war, coups and armed violence lumped together) 
because it recognizes that different forms of conflict may have different determinants 
(Reagan and Norton, 2005; O’Brien, 2002).  To investigate the determinants of conflict
Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) estimate a family of encompassing multinomial regressions using
a global database from 1950-1999, accounting for three types of domestic violence (civ
wars, coups and other violent outcomes) as well as a host of “grievance” and “opportuni
variables commonly analyzed in the recent empirical literature.
9    
Social characteristics and political institutions play a large role both in explain
political violence (Bodea and Elbadawi, 2007) and as well as when we estimate the
determinants of economic growth later on in this paper.  Therefo
 greater detail.  We use the typology of democracy put forward by Goldstone et al. 
(2005) in their study of political instability.  Specifically, we follow Goldstone et al. and rely 
on two underlying component variables of the Polity IV score: The measure of executive 
recruitment (exrec) and the competitiveness of political participation (parcomp) (Appendix 
 
9 We control for the following variables:  Lagged log of GDP/capita (lgdpenl); Log of lagged population (lpopl1); 




eligious (relfrac), and linguistic (numlang) – 
as well 
istent with theoretical expectations: Low income 
countri
                                                
Figure A3).
10  A combination of these two components has the best predictive ability in the 
Goldstone et al. study and, moreover, reflects the degree to which the political system allows 
societal actors to translate their preferences into policy with the help of peaceful mechanisms 
such as voting and elections.  The upshot is that meaningful elections will decrease the 
appeal of violent means of political contestation.    
Further, we use several measures from Fearon and Laitin (2003) to capture the 
degree of fractionalization of societies - ethnic (ef), r
as Reynal-Querol’s index of language fractionalization (Qlf).   Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004 a) find that ethnic dominance increases the chances of civil war and we employ two 
measures of ethnic and religious dominance (dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the 
largest ethnic / religious group is between 45 and 90 percent of the population).  For the 
purposes of creating instruments for the different types of organized political violence we 
use the partition of social fractionalization along ethnic and language lines, which were the 
strongest predictors of civil war onset.
11 
The results from the multinomial model of organized political violence are shown in 
Table 1.  The results are largely cons
es are more likely to experience coups and civil wars (insignificant income coefficient 
for riots).  Oil rich countries are more prone to have civil wars; compared with autocracies, 
full democracy reduces the chance that contestation of political power will involve violent 
means (negative and significant democracy coefficients for our three outcomes - riots, coups, 
and civil wars).  Of the hybrid, anocratic regimes – partial democracies and partial 
autocracies - only partial democracies that develop factional politics increases the risk for all 
three of our violent outcomes, while partial autocracies increase the risk of riots and coups, 
but not the risk of civil war.  The reference category for social fractionalization variables is 
our cross-cutting category that is countries with moderately high ethnic and language 
fractionalization.  The results show that social fractionalization increases the likelihood of 
war onset: when compared to moderately divided countries, homogenous societies have a 
lower risk of civil war onset and extremely divided societies have a higher risk.   
 
10 See Polity IV data at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
11 From our typology the following are diverse countries: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Sudan, South Africa, Papua New 
Guinea, Tanzania, Uganda, Togo, Zambia.   Homogenous societies: Albania, Armenia, Denmark, Egypt, 
Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, South Korea, Libya, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
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We use the model in Table 1 to predict the probabilities of violent outcome from 
riots, to coups and civil war.  Table 2 shows the average predicted probabilities
e violent outcomes against the actual outcomes.  Given the notorious difficulty in 
predicting war outcomes, our model is doing a relatively good job predicting organized 
political violence: The average predicted probability across outcomes is twice as large when 
an actual event occurred.  For example, the average probability of a riot happening is 0.33 
for the cases when an actual riot did occur and 0.16 when there were no riots.  Also, our 
model gives an average of 5% chances for the onset of civil war for the cases when a war 
actually starts that particular year, and 2% chances otherwise.  Table 3 goes on to show the 
average predicted probabilities for the three violent outcomes for the specific geographical 
regions.  Note that in our sample Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest average probability that 
a civil war would occur over the period 1950 to 1999 – approximately 3.8%.  Asia minus 
Japan comes in second with an average probability of war onset of 2.9%.  Further, Figure 2 
shows the relative density of the predicted probabilities of war onset in the countries in our 
sample for the period 1950 to 1999.  We show the densities separately for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the rest of the developing world, for the whole duration of the sample and 
respectively for the most recently available period, the 1990s.  For the whole period – 1950 
to 1999 – the Sub-Saharan Africa density distribution is fat on the tail, with a fair amount of 
country years facing a probability of civil war onset larger than 5%.  The rest of the 
developing world, however, sees much fewer country years with a risk of civil war onset 
larger then 5%.  The difference between Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the developing 
world is even more striking in the most recent period available.  In the 1990s in the 
developing world without Sub-Saharan Africa, most country years see a risk of civil war 
smaller than 6%, and all country years face less then 10% risk of war.  Sub-Saharan Africa, 
on the other hand has a significant amount of country years with risk of civil war higher than 
6%, and the region sees a risk of war as high as 30% in the 1990s.
12   
 
12 The Sub-Saharan Africa countries which in the 1990s have a risk of civil war close to 30% are Liberia, 
Ethiopia, Senegal, Congo, Somalia and Gambia.  




    
                                                
 
IV.  Economic Growth and Political Violence: The Evidence 
The model in section II suggests that the onset of political violence reduces 
economic growth and increases its volatility.
13  However, the received literature on civil war 
and other political violence also suggests that economic factors, including economic growth 
and income per capita, determines the opportunity costs of peace as well as the ability of the 
state to quell a potential challenge to its authority.   Moreover, the some of the recent 
empirical literature suggests that these economic factors are robust determinants of the 
hazard of violent political conflicts.
14  Furthermore, economic outcomes (growth and 
income per capita) associated with political violence are themselves endogenous to the 
economic and political institutions that govern the organization of the political processes and 
economic activities in a society.  In turn, the prevailing economic and political institutions 
are influenced and shaped by deeper societal and geography characteristics.
15
Most empirical evidence on the relationship between institutions and ethnic 
fractionalization appears to support the view that social fractionalization, especially ethnic 
fractionalization, constitutes a challenge for the emergence of development-oriented 
institutions and is, therefore, associated with a bad policy environment.  For example, 
Easterly and Levine (1997) establish that ethnic diversity leads to bad policy, which, in turn, 
decelerates growth, both effects being quite powerful. Indeed, they suggest that much of 
Africa’s slow growth is attributable to its ethnic diversity.  Ethnic diversity has also been 
shown to contribute to government dysfunction in several areas of economic policies, both 
in developed and in developing countries alike.  For example, local or central governments in 
ethnically diverse societies tend to under-spend on public goods and education (Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Goldin and Katz, 1999); produce low quality of services (Mauro, 
1995; La  Porta, 1999); generate greater political instability (Mauro, 1995; Annett, 1999); or 
misuse foreign aid and divert it into corruption (Svensson, 2000).
16  Africa specific literature, 
based on survey data, also finds evidence of dysfunction in government and civil society 
organizations.  For example, Collier and Garg (1999) find that employment in the public 
 
13 The analysis of the impact of political violence on growth volatility is beyond the scope of this paper. 
14 See, for example, Sambanis (2004) for a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence on the determinants 
of civil war; and Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) on the determinants of riots, coups and civil wars in a multinomial 
model of political violence.  
15 There is recently an active debate on the “deep” determinants of growth and income disparities across 
nations and sub-national regions (for a review of the debates, see, for example, Easterly and Levine, 2003, 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004, and Elbadawi, 2005).    




                                                
sector in ethnically diverse Ghana was determined by patronage, not merit.  Also Michael 
(1999) provides one more example from western Kenya, where he finds primary schools in 
ethnically diverse districts to be sharply under-funded. 
There is also equally robust empirical support for the view that geography could 
affect development indirectly through institutions.
17  There are different views on how 
geography shapes institutions.  The “location” view, for example, credits the emergence of 
modern coastal city states in southern Europe to the easy access to maritime trade, which led 
to an unprecedented expansion of merchant class, ship-builders and other associated service 
communities that depended on transnational trade.  This emerging social class had, in turn, 
acted as a formidable agent pushing for the type of institutions required for expansion of 
trade and wealth creation.  There is also the “Crop” theory of institutions (Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000), which argues that in countries where 
physical environments are more conducive to plantation-based agriculture, less egalitarian 
and less inclusive institutions developed.  On the other hand, the “Germs” theory of 
institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002) is built on the observation that 
in colonies with an inhospitable germ environment (as measured by the mortality rate of 
European colonialists), colonial authorities established “extractive” institutions.  European 
colonialists tended to settle and, therefore, establish settler-class institutions in more 
hospitable germ environments.  The survey of this recent literature shows a large body of 
work corroborating the indirect role of social characteristics and geography on growth and 
political violence, channeled through the effects of political and economic institutions and 
their outcomes.   
In addition, recent growth theory and rational choice models of political conflicts 
emphasize a direct effect as well.  Yet, while the indirect effects of variables such as ethnic (or 
religious) fractionalization or landlockedness and tropical climate were found to be robustly 
associated with economic policy and institutions, the empirical evidence on their direct effect 
remains mixed.
18  Similarly, and despite strong theoretical arguments directly linking societal 
characteristics (such as ethnic fractionalizations and polarization) and geography 
 
17 See for example, Rodrik et al (2004), and Easterly and Levine (2003). 
18 Most evidence suggests that institutions have direct effects on income, while geography doesn’t (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al, 2004).  On the other hand, Sachs (2003) 
and more recently Carstensen and Gundlach (2006) show that malaria transmission, which is strongly affected 
by ecological conditions, directly affects the level of per capita income after controlling for the quality of 
institutions.  (mountainous terrain or forests) to political violence, relatively limited robust association was 
found in the data.
19 
Identifying the true effect of political violence on economic growth requires 
controlling for the feedback effects from growth to political violence and vice versa as well 
as accounting for the common factors jointly determining these two vital development 
outcomes.  Such factors must include economic and political institutions directly affecting 
the two outcomes as well as the social and geography characteristics that might be driving 
institutional outcomes.  The societal and geography characteristics should not be treated as 
excluded (external) instruments because, despite the limited empirical evidence, there are 
also strong theoretical arguments for their having direct effects on growth and political 
violence.  To fix the issues, we develop our empirical estimations around the following 
structural model: 
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Where, p is the probability of the onset of political violence, which is a non-linear function 
of economic growth: g; income per capita: y; political institutions: Polity; and the time-
invariant social characteristics (Social) and the warfare technology (WarefareTech), which 
accounts for the land area of mountainous terrain.  Economic growth, in turn, linearly 
depends on the probability of political violence; convergence effect (lagged per capita 
income); a range of economic and policy institutions; and similar sets of social and political 
variables to those of the violence equation.  Except for the time-invariant Social and 
WarfareTech, all other regressors in equations 16 and 17 are presumed to be endogenous, 
most notably p and g.   Our estimation strategy is a sequential one, which allows us to first 
estimate the risk of political violence, given initial growth and per capita income; then the 
growth equation can focus on analyzing the direct effects on growth of essentially all the 
controls that are likely to jointly influence conflicts and growth as well as their indirect effect 





                                                 
19 For example, two of the most widely quoted studies on the causes of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a; 
and Fearon and Laitin, 2003) fail to find robust association between civil wars and social fractionalization.  
However, Sambanis (2004), who develops and uses a more comprehensive and better validated civil war onset 
dataset, finds that social fractionalization are more robustly associated with civil wars.  Moreover, Bodea and 
Elbadawi (2006) estimate a multinomial model of violence (civil wars, riots/uprisings, coups) and find that 
social fractionalization has had a robust negative and monotonic effect on civil war; and is positively but non-
monotonically associated with coups. would still need to identify both equations.  To do this, we hypothesize that some of the 
lagged conflicts variables in the multinomial political violence regression (Table 1), such as 
the incidence of riots in the past five years, are likely to affect expectations about future riots 
or other forms of political violence but are not likely to have a direct effect on growth.  This 
should identify the growth regressions (Table 4).  On the other hand, some economic and 
institutional variables in the growth regressions, such as trade openness or inflation, are not 
likely to have a direct impact of the hazard of political violence.  This should identify the 







                                                
Focusing on the growth regression, we note that most of the received literature 
attempts to identify the growth effect of civil war onset by using one period lags of all the 
potentially endogenous right-hand side variables, most notably the indicator variable of civil 
war onset.
20  This could be a useful strategy in minimizing the number of variables to be 
instrumented.  However, the validity of this simpler approach hinges on a more restrictive 
assumption about the temporal endogeneity of political violence and the other endogenous 
right hand side variables.  Instead, we adopt a two stage process for identifying the reduced 
form growth model derived from the above structural equations.  First, we use the 
multinomial model of section III to predict the probability of political violence, p ˆ .
21  
Second, by using the predicted probability in equation 17 we have a standard linear growth 
model, which allows us to exploit dynamic panel regressions to account for potential 
endogeneity of lagged income and other explanatory variables as well as control for country-
invariant period-specific effects and unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.  Moreover, 
the models estimated in this literature also permit the latter to be correlated with lagged 
income and other endogenous explanatory vari
We, therefore, posit the following reduced form growth model, which also accounts 
for some non-linear interaction effects between social and political factors: 
 
 
20 Two exceptions are Brempong and Corley (2005), who estimate a dynamic GMM panel growth regression 
and instrument for the incidence of civil war by its predicted probability; and Elbadawi and Ndung'u (2005), 
who estimates a structural model centered on growth and the risk of civil war, using a variety of estimation 
techniques, including FIML. 
21 The two step estimation is dictated by our preference for the multinomial model to the linear probability 
estimation of political violence because the former is theoretically and empirically more appropriate than even 
the partial logit/probit models (Bodea and Elbadawi, 2007). 
22 See for example, Loayza and Soto (2002) and Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderon (2005).   (18)     it i t it
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where i and t are country and time indexes, respectively; Controls is a vector of standard 
control variables that are robustly associated with cross-country growth (initial per capita 
GDP, initial GDP cyclical component, inflation, government expenditure as a share of 
GDP, human capital investment, a rule of law index, and a measure of trade openness); 
and, t μ ,  i η and it ε are, respectively, time and country fixed-effects and a random disturbance 
term.  
We estimate equation 18 by a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic 
panel estimator using a panel of 68 countries, including 15 from SSA and 37 from other 
developing regions, over six 5-year non-overlapping averages spanning the period 1970 until 
1999 (Table A.2 of the Appendix contains the list of countries and period coverage).  The 
system GMM (developed in Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1997) 
implemented here, uses lagged values of the dependent and independent variables as 
instrument (called ‘internal instruments’) and combines regressions in differences with the 
regressions in levels to better address the issue of weak instrumentation often attributed to 
the older, difference estimator.  Under the assumed moment conditions, the system GMM 
accounts for the combined problems of endogeneity and unobserved country effects.  The 
consistency of the GMM system estimator is assessed by two specification tests.  The Sargan 
test of overidentifying restrictions tests the overall validity of the instruments.  Failure to 
reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model.  The second test examines the null 
hypothesis that the error term is not serially correlated.  Again, failure to reject the null 
hypothesis gives support to the model.  Rejecting the null hypothesis would imply that the 
instruments are inappropriate and would call for higher-order lags of the variables to be used 
as instruments.   
The regression results along with the Sargan and the serial-correlation tests are 
reported in Table 4.  All six regressions in the table include the standard control variables, 
normally estimated in growth regressions.  In general, all standard growth fundamentals have 
the expected sign and are statistically significant.  Moreover, both the Sargan and the serial-
correlation tests validate our specification.  In addition to standard control variables, 
regression 1 also accounts for the probability of aggregate political violence; while in 








                                                
the three sub-components: riots/uprising, coups, and civil war.  Regression 3 embeds 
regression 1 by further accounting for ethnic fractionalization as well; and similarly 
regression 4 embeds regression 2.  Finally, regressions 5 and 6, respectively, embed 
regressions 3 and 4 by also controlling for democracy, as a measure of the quality of political 
institutions, as well as the interactions between democracy and ethnic fractionalization. 
The results of regressions 1, 3 & 5 show that aggregate political violence is negatively 
and robustly associated with growth.  Moreover, its influence gets stronger, both in terms of 
statistical significance and the magnitude of the estimated coefficient, the more 
encompassing the regression becomes.  Nevertheless, the estimates are still comparable, as 
they range form -0.016 for regression 1 to -0.025 for regression 5.  However, regressions 2, 4 
& 6 reveal that the growth effect of political violence tends to vary across manifestation of 
violence.  While, surprisingly, coups were not found to have an impact on growth; both of 
riots/uprising and civil wars were robustly and negatively associated with growth.  One 
possible interpretation of this result is that coups are likely to be manifestations of 
establishmentarian power struggles within the ruling elites, and are, therefore, not likely to 
entail major paradigm shifts in the social contract.  However, even if we assume that most 
coups are of this nature, they are likely to have grave consequences for growth
23.  Therefore, 
we think that coups should have a negative and significant growth effect but was not 
explicable in our regressions, perhaps due to the high temporal dependence between coups 
and the legacy of civil wars and riots/uprisings (Bodea and Elbadawi, 2007)
24.  Turning to 
the other two types of political violence, we find that the estimated coefficient of civil war 
was large, ranging between -0.24 for regression 6 to -0.39 for regression 4.  On the other 
hand, the corresponding coefficient for riots/uprisings was much smaller, hovering around 
0.02 for regressions 2 and 6.
25    
Probing further into the results of regression 6, we briefly analyze the growth 
deceleration effect of one standard deviation shocks to the hazards of civil war and riots 
(Figure 3).  For the whole sample (and the developing world outside SSA), one standard 
 
23 For example, coups derail nascent democracies, thereby, setting back transparency and rule of law.   More 
recently, unconstitutional change of political regimes, such as coups, might invite economic and political 
sanctions.    
24 Moreover, the contemporaneous correlation between civil wars and coups is also quite high (at 0.56).  An 
alternative explanation for the insignificant effect of coup probability is that coups are followed by regimes that 
differ widely in the appeal they make to private investors (Duggan 2007).  Thus, investors may behave 
differently depending on their expectation about the likelihood of coup success, potential involvement of a 
major capitalist power and the regime that would follow a coup.  At this stage we do not differentiate coups 
according to the political regime that is likely to follow, and the consequence our treatment may be the 
indeterminacy of the findings with respect to the threat of coups.   
25 For regression 4, riots/uprising was only marginally significant (at higher than 10% significant level). deviation shock to civil war decelerates the rate of per capita growth by 0.48%, which is 
almost 1.5 times the effect due to riots.  For SSA, however, civil war was much more 
damaging, where a similar shock would reduce the rate of growth by 0.72, compared to 
0.28% for riots.  As expected, civil war was not a concern for OECD countries, where a 
shock to the hazard of riots leads to growth deceleration of 0.34%, while the growth effect 
of civil wars was inconsequential at -0.07%.  An alternative articulation of the growth effects 
of civil war and riots would be to analyze their growth elasticities, which allows discussion of 
the rate of change in the growth rates rather than the absolute change (given by the 
deceleration in the rate of growth due to a given shock).  The elasticities, which depend on 
the average rates of growth and the average predicted probabilities
26, reveal a much stronger 
contrast between SSA and the rest of the developing world (Table 5).  For example, the 
long-run (whole period) average growth elasticity of civil war is estimated at more than -6.0 
for SSA
27, compared to -0.32 for the rest of the developing world and only -0.03 for OECD.  
On the other hand, decadal average elasticities are significantly smaller for SSA and are 
comparable to other developing regions, especially in the 1980s decade.  However, while the 
elasticity declined from more than -1.0 in the 1980s to -0.2 in the 1990s for other developing 
regions, it was -1.3 or less during the two decades for SSA.  To a lesser extent, a similar story 
could be told about the elasticity of riots across regions.  The long-run (period average) 
elasticity is again much higher for SSA (at -2.4) compared to other developing regions and 
OECD (at -0.3 and -0.2, respectively).  However, as for the case of civil war, the decadal 
average elasticites are more comparable across regions. 
Interpreting the divergent elasticity estimates for SSA and the rest of the developing 
world in the context of the model simulations of Figure 1 would suggest that these estimates 
cannot be assigned to a unique combination of risk aversion and indirect effects of the 
disruption, diversion and dissaving channels.   However, the high whole period estimates for 
SSA (of about -6.0) would correspond to a combination of risk neutral to risk taking 
behavior and low net indirect effects {e.g.  ) , ( 0 0 β α γ + = (0.15, 0.0) & (1.0, 0.05)} or 
moderate risk aversion but high indirect effects {e.g. (2.0, 0.125) & (4.0, 0.25).  On the other 
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27 The long-run elasticity for SSA is so high because, despite its relatively high hazard of conflict, long-term 




                                                
hand, the low estimates for the rest of the developing countries (-0.32) would correspond to 
a combination of moderate to high risk aversion and low indirect effects {e.g. (3.0, 0.0) & 
(15.0, 0.05).  If we assume that agents in and outside Africa tend to display identical and 
moderate risk aversion, the division between Africa and other developing regions would 
suggest that African wars are likely to have a more devastating impact on already relatively 
weak state institutions, thus, perhaps, disproportionately degrading the quality of public 
policy and services as well as precipitating stronger reaction by individual agents.  That is to 
say, for a given degree of risk aversion and direct asset depletion impact due to wars, the 
combined net effects of the disruption, diversion and dissaving channels tend to be stronger 
for the case of African wars.  
Finally we discuss the results for ethnic fractionalization and democracy.  According 
to regressions 3 and 4, ethnic fractionalization was not found to be significant in either 
regression.  However, in the more encompassing regressions 5 & 6, which also accounts for 
democracy, it was negatively and significantly associated with growth.   Following Bodea and 
Elbadawi (2007), we disaggregate the Polity index into full democracy, partial factional 
democracy and partial non-factional democracy, in addition to the other sub-indexes of 
autocracy and transitional/interregnum democracy.   The effect of democracy is estimated 
relative to the latter two sub-indexes, which are excluded from the regression.   Moreover, 
the full democracy index is dominated by the OECD countries, for which the score was 
essentially at its maximum level for most of the estimation period.   Hence, this index is 
observationally equivalent to an OECD dummy and was, therefore, also dropped from the 
regressions.       
The results also suggest that, relative to autocracy and transitional-interregnum 
polity, partial factional democracy, as expected, does not have a direct linear effect on 
growth (regression 5 & 6).  On the other hand, partial but non-factional democracy was 
positively and highly significantly associated with growth in the disaggregated-political 
violence model (regression 6).
 28  Moreover, the interaction between partial democracy (both 
factional and non-factional) and ethnic fractionalization was positively and highly 
significantly associated with growth in the aggregate-political violence model (regression 5).   
However, in the more encompassing disaggregated-political violence model, the partial 
democracy-ethnic fractionalization interaction has no growth effect for the case of factional 
 
28 The exclusion of the “full democracy” sub-index is not likely to be consequential for this discussion, because 
only partial democracy matters for the developing world, as “full democracy” is not realistically within the 




                                                
partial democracy (regression 6).  The magnitudes of these effects are quite large.  For 
example, controlling for aggregate political violence and ethnic fractionalization (regression 
5), partial democracy (both factional and non-factional) reduces the negative growth effect 
of ethnic fractionalization by half (from 2 to 1%).  Moreover, in the disaggregated-political 
violence model (regression 6), non-factional partial democracy reduces the ethnic 
fractionalization effect by a comparable margin from -1.5 to -1.0%.  The results of regression 
6 also suggest that the growth effects of democracy are larger in socially fractionalized 
societies, with the positive marginal growth effect of democracy rising from 2 to 3%.  These 
results strongly corroborate the strand of the growth literature that suggests that, once the 
rules of the political game in which the inter-ethnic contest is fought or the underlining 
institutions that mediate the effect of social diversity are accounted for, ethnic 
fractionalization does not have an independent growth retarding effect or that its effect is 
substantially reduced
29.    
 
IV.1 Simulating  the  Impact of Civil War 
The quest for understanding the disappointing performance of SSA relative to other 
developing regions, most notably the East Asian frontier performers, has led many 
researchers to use cross-country growth regressions to assess the relative importance of a 
variety of growth determinants in explaining the expanding EA-SSA per capita income (and 
growth) differentials.  While acknowledging that, like the cross-country growth regression 
technique itself, such quantification entails possibly implausible assumptions
30; we argue, 
however, that it is still a useful benchmark, especially if the underlining regressions attempt 
to control for endogeneity and country heterogeneity, as we claim our GMM dynamic panel 
model does.   In assessing the development impact of civil war for SSA, we analyze its 
contribution to the expanding income per capita gap in favor of EA.  As the above analysis 
 
29 For example, the results of Collier (1998, 2000) suggest that full democracy completely remove the growth 
drawbacks otherwise associated with ethnic diversity; while Easterly (2001a,b) finds that good quality 
institutions significantly mitigate the negative effects of ethnic diversity on overall growth as well as on a wide 
range of macroeconomic polices.  Moreover, Rodrik (1999) finds that high quality economic or political 
institutions tend to mitigate the influence of ethnic diversity on persistence of growth following external 
shocks.   Finally, based on his econometric results Elbadawi (2002) argues that Africa's ethnic diversity (if taken 
as the main component of social divisions in African societies) has no independent deleterious effect on long-
term growth once the combined influences due to the lack of functioning democratic institutions and the 
geographic fractionalization of African societies are accounted for. 
30 See, for example, Durlauf (2002), who argues that estimated coefficients in growth regressions do not 
necessarily provide a valid framework for evaluation of alternative policy trajectories (which, in our case, would 
include the counterfactual scenario of no civil war).  Instead, he proposed an alternative interpretation of 
growth regression based on Bayesian averaging techniques, accounting for the payoff function of the policy 
maker and model uncertainty regarding the subsets of the growth fundamentals and forms of country 
heterogeneity that are most relevant for the analysis at hand. makes clear, compared to other developing regions, civil war has been a major drag on 
Africa’s growth: a one standard deviation shock to the hazard of civil war decelerates growth 
in SSA by 1.5 times its effect in other developing regions.  Though the median duration of 
African civil wars is comparable, if not shorter, than in other regions, SSA has, nevertheless, 
experienced several very long wars.
31  These particular wars, therefore, are likely to have 
been very costly--in terms of forgone output relative to the counterfactual of no civil war-- 
in an already very poor region.  We address this issue as well by analyzing the costs of the 
Sudanese civil war, which was one of the longest civil wars in Africa (1983-2002).  This war 
ended in 2002 as a result of a cease-fire brokered by regional and international mediators, 
which eventually led to the signing of a full-fledged peace agreement in 2005.   
We write the growth outcome in regression 6 of Table 4 in the following generic 
form: 
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where t= 0,…, T; and  , respectively, denote annual per capita GDP 
growth, per capita income, predicted probabilities of  civil war and riots, and all other 
determinants of g except for violence and .  By simple recursive substitution, the 
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East Asia-Africa income differential 
Assuming that EA and SSA have the same risk of riots and similar sets of standard growth 
fundamentals, we can use equation 20 and write the income ratio between the two regions in 
the following two equations: 
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For t=1,…, T.  Note that, under the above assumptions, the growth differential is accounted 
for by the civil war effect and the mechanical convergence term only.  This simulation allows 
us to compute the marginal contribution of civil war to the EA-SSA income differential.  
Taking 1970-74 to be the initial period (t=0), we note that average GDP per capita for EA in 
this period was about three times the average income in SSA, which is already very high 
compared to the latter.  However, as a result of vastly superior and sustained growth, the 
East Asian per capita income reached almost 4 times that of the SSA in 1999.  Therefore, we 
ask the question as to how much has civil war contributed to this wide and expanding 
income gap between the two regions.  Our estimates suggest that up to the second half of 
the 1980s, EA was assessed as the riskier region.  Therefore, the war effect contributed, 
albeit marginally, to the narrowing of the gap between the two regions.   However, by the 
turn of the 1990s, especially toward the end of the decade into the new century, SSA 
emerged as the substantially riskier region and the growth impact of civil war started to make 
an increasingly large contribution to the expanding income gap (Figure 4).  For example, the 
contribution of civil war to the EA-SSA income differential precipitously rose from 3.5% in 
1990 to 22.5% in 1999.   With the further deterioration of political security in SSA in the 
new Millennium, while most other regions started to enjoy a significant decline in political 
violence
32, civil war is likely to become even more important as a cause of Africa’s economic 
decline, especially relative to the increasingly peaceful EA.   
 
Estimating the costs of war 
Finally, we analyze the evolution of income during the conflict cycle in Sudan, 
expressed relative to its level in an initial period (1975-79) prior to the onset of the civil 
war.
33  Assuming that the risk of riots and other growth fundamentals remain the same as in 
the initial period, we have:   
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For t=1,…, T.  The income ratio curve (W(t)) is less than 1 for t>1 (Figure 5).  The size of 
the area between the horizontal line W(0)=1 and the W(t) curve is equal to the total costs of 
the war divided by the per capita income in the initial period, which is equal to about $309 in 
2000 fixed prices.  Therefore, it is straightforward to estimate the total costs of the Sudanese 
war, which comes to $787 in per capita terms.  This suggests that the more than 20 years 
long war have cost the country more than two and a half years worth of the annual GDP 
during (1975-79).  Expressed in terms of total absolute costs, we estimate that the total dollar 
value in year 2000 USD is 23 billion.   Finally, the same calculations also allow comparing the 
actual per capita income to the potential income under the counterfactual scenario of no civil 
war (Figure 6).  Starting from an income per capita of $309 (in 2000 fixed prices), we 
estimate that, had it not been for the war, the Sudan would have realized an income per 
capita of $464 in 2002, compared to the actual income of $408.    
The analysis of the costs of the Sudanese civil war contributes to a small literature on 
the indirect costs of internal conflicts.  In a recent survey on the costs of armed conflicts- 
prepared for the “International Task Force on Global Public Goods”- Elisabeth Skons 
(2004) identifies only four studies on internal conflicts (Brown and Rosecrance, 1999; 
Stewart and FitzGerald, 2001; Collier et al, 2003; and, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004b).
34   The 
first study was concerned with the costs of prevention of conflicts to external parties but not 
to the conflict-affected countries themselves, while the second and third studies discuss the 
analytical underpinnings and the channels through which internal civil wars can be costly.  
However, neither study attempts to systematically quantify the monetary costs of civil wars.  
On the other hand, the paper by Collier and Hoeffler uses an estimate of the growth effect 
of -2.2% (due to Collier, 1999) to compute the average costs of civil war for a war-affected 
country to be around 105% of initial GDP, which comes to about $21 b (in 1985 fixed 
prices).
35  Their aggregate estimate also includes other costs: loss of GDP to neighbors 
(115% of the conflict-affected country’s initial GDP); the costs due to the diversion of 
expenditure to the military for the country in question as well as well as for its neighbors 
(30% of GDP); and costs due to the health impact of conflicts (about $5b).  This would 
 
34 Skons’ review also includes two studies on the costs of the war in Iraq (Nordhaus, 2002; Bennis et al. 2004).  
The Iraq war is, however, a different type of conflict than the civil wars in low-income countries. 
35 Collier and Hoeffler estimate the average GDP for conflict-affected low-income countries (excluding China 
and India) prior to civil war onset to be $19.7 (in 1985 fixed prices) and apply the cumulative -2.2% growth 
effect to this initial income for a period of 21 years, including seven years of conflicts and 14 years of post-
conflict.  The latter is their estimate of the average period a country takes to recover to its pre-conflict national 




                                                
scale up to about $54 b.  However, the sub-component of their total estimate of costs that 
directly pertain to the conflict-affected country, but not accounting for the recovery period 
($21 b) is very comparable to the above initial estimate of this paper.   
However, the costs of the Sudanese civil war will be much larger if we account for 
the post-conflict recovery period needed to bring economic activity to the level prior to the 
civil war.    If we assume that recovery takes an equal of number of years to the duration of 
conflict (another 20 years)
36, the total cost would be double the estimated cost of war.   
Hence without accounting for the negative externality of the Sudanese civil war in terms of 
excessive military expenditure and the health effects, including death, injury and 
psychological scars, the total cost will come to about $46 billion (in fixed 2000 fixed prices).   
This is about twice Sudan’s outstanding stock of external debt.   
 
 
V.   Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature analyzing the development and economic 
growth impact of organized political violence.  We use a formal endogenous growth model 
to analyze the general equilibrium growth effects of political violence.   We show that, under 
plausible assumptions about risk aversion during times of conflict, the overall effects of 
organized political violence are likely to be much higher than its direct capital destruction 
impact.   Using a multinomial model of violence that distinguishes between three levels of 
political violence (riots, coups and civil war), we use predicted probabilities of aggregate 
violence and its three types to identify their growth effects in an encompassing growth 
model.  The model is estimated by dynamic panel regressions that fully account for country 
heterogeneity and potential endogeneity.  Compared to the received literature, our 
instrument for organized political violence is sharper because our multinomial specification 
better reflects the nature of violence as an ongoing and diverse process.  We view organized 
political violence as a complex process with multiple manifestations, one of which is civil 
war, and this helps us define more precisely what the benchmark for our analyses should be, 
i.e. for what we think defines periods of relative peace as opposed to conflict.  We can 
therefore specify multiple risks that a country faces at any given time (risk of civil war, coups 
or violent riots) and assess their separate effects on economic growth.    
 
36 This is a modest assumption compared to the ones adopted in the literature.  For example, Collier, Chauvet 
and Hegre (2007) assume that civil war duration of seven years would require about 14 years of post-conflict 




First and foremost, political violence, especially civil war, was found to be negatively 
and highly significantly associated with growth even after controlling for the direct growth 
effects of some of its potential determinants, such as ethnic fractionalization and democracy.  
The indirect effects of these factors are accounted for by including them in the equation that 
instruments for the probability of political violence.  Further, unlike previous studies we 
control for the relevant types of democracy from the perspective of the developing countries 
and find that only non-factional partial democracy has a direct and independent positive 
growth effect.  That is, political regimes involving some degree of competitive political 
participation and the relatively free election of the executive are instrumental to growth only 
if they do not promote parochial or ethnic-based particularist agendas that favor group 
members to the detriment of common, secular and cross-cutting agendas.  The effect of 
non-factional democracy is even more compelling because it does not only have an 
independent effect on per-capita income growth but it also reduces the negative growth 
effect of ethnic fractionalization, particularly when we distinguish among the types of 
organized political violence.  As we discussed in section IV, the above results are new and 
have much more profound implications than just corroborating the evidence from the 
received literature.     
Second, while our results have global applicability, we focus on the implications for 
SSA, given that it has become the most conflict-ridden region in the world.  Our results 
show that not only has Sub-Saharan Africa been the region with the worst performance but 
that there are great risks for the region in the future.  Specifically, we find large negative 
effects of the risk of civil wars on economic growth and we also find that in the 1990s the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region has been increasingly at risk of war, while the other developing 
world appears to have learned to manage conflicts in a more peaceful manner. This is 
reflected in the increasingly high contribution of the risk of civil war to the widening income 
gap between SSA and East Asia.   We estimate that the risk of civil war has accounted for 
more than 22% of this income gap in 1999; and with the further deterioration of political 
security in SSA in the new Millennium, civil war is likely to become even more important as 
a cause of economic decline in Africa.   We attempt to explain the divergent estimates of the 
growth effects of civil wars for SSA relative to the rest of the developing world in the 
context of our simulation model.  We argue that perhaps African civil wars tend to more 
disproportionately degrade the quality of public policy and services as well as precipitate 




dissaving effects.  Moreover, we estimate that civil war has also been very costly for the 
many poor African countries, which also happen to have experienced long conflicts, such as 
the Sudan.   A modest estimate of the costs of the Sudanese civil war would come to $46 b 
(in 2000 fixed prices), which is twice the country’s stock of external debt.   
Third, to draw the implications of the above findings for SSA, we start by stating the 
obvious: that SSA is in a conflict-underdevelopment trap.  This statement is neither new nor 
controversial.  However, our results suggest an important new twist to this generally 
accepted proposition about the recent African development discourse.   In our view, Africa’s 
ethnic fractionalization lies at the heart of this trap.  Not because it is destiny but because we 
need to explicitly account for it in the design of development strategies.  Specifically, to 
break free from this trap, we will argue, Africa needs to better manage its ethnic diversity 
and the way to do it is to develop non-factional democracy.   Democratic but factional polity 




Table 1: Organized Political Violence, Democratic Governance, and 
Social Diversity (language and ethnicity) 
 Multinomial  model 
 Riot  Coup  Civil  war 
Log lagged GDP/capita  0.1  -0.2*  -0.3** 
 (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.2) 
Log lagged population  0.2***  -0.1  0.2** 
 (0.0)  (0.1)  (0.1) 
Oil -0.2  -0.0  0.6** 
 (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.3) 
Log of mountainous   0.01  0.01  0.1 
terrain   (0.01)  (0.1)  (0.1) 
Instability -0.1  -0.2  0.2 
 (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.3) 
Lagged transitional   0.5*  0.6  1.3*** 
and interregnum regimes (0.3) (0.4)  (0.5) 
Lagged democracy   -0.3*  -3.1***  -1.4* 
 (0.2)  (1.0)  (0.8) 
Lagged factional  0.4***  0.6***  0.8** 
partial democracy  (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.3) 
Lagged non-factional  0.1  -0.1  -0.4 
partial democracy  (0.2)  (0.3)  (0.5) 
Lagged partial autocracy  0.4*  0.7***  -0.5 
 (0.2)  (0.3)  (0.6) 
Coup in the past 5 years -0.2*  1.3***  0.4* 
 (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.2) 
Number of years with   0.6***  0.4***  0.3*** 
riots in the past 5 years  (0.0)  (0.1)  (0.1) 
Civil war ongoing in the   -0.2  0.3  -0.4 
past year  (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.3) 
Partially  homogenous  0.1  -0.1  0.4 
 (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.3) 
Partially  diverse  0.2  0.2  0.4 
 (0.2)  (0.3)  (0.4) 
Diverse 0.2  0.2  0.8* 
 (0.2)  (0.3)  (0.5) 
Homogenous 0.3*  -0.2  -1.7* 
 (0.2)  (0.3)  (1.0) 
Ethnic dominance  0.1  -0.01  0.1 
 (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.3) 
Constant -5.3***  -1.3  -3.9*** 
 (0.6)  (1.1)  (1.5) 
Number of events in the sample  835  210  91 
Observations 4231 
Log Likelihood  -2802.1 
Note:  The samples have 125 countries and go from 1950 to 1999.  The table shows coefficients (standard errors in 
parentheses below coefficients) from a multinomial logit regression in which the reference outcome is periods with no new 
civil war onsets, no riots and no coups.  Stars show conventional levels of statistical significance: * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The reference category for regime dummy variables are autocracies. The reference 
category for social fractionalization variables is our cross-cutting category. The results from a multinomial probit regression 
are similar to the results shown here.  Results are robust if we include a cold war dummy variable.  Ethnic dominance is a 
dummy variable that equal 1 when the largest ethnic / religious group represents between 45 and 90 percent of the 





Table 2.   Goodness of fit of the violence model 
Outcome predicted probabilities versus actual outcomes 
 
Actual outcome 
Average predicted probability 
  Probability of a riot 
Riot  0.33 
All other outcomes  0.16 
  Probability of a coup 
Coup  0.10 
All other outcomes  0.04 
  Probability of civil war onset 
Civil war onset  0.05 
All other outcomes  0.02 


























Actual number of 




0.038 45  0.069  107  0.13  127 
North Africa & 
Middle East 
0.018 20  0.046  43  0.17  120 
Asia (-Japan)  0.029 33  0.052  39  0.24  191 
Latin America  0.02 13  0.087  87  0.21  255 
Eastern Europe  0.013 9  0.02  4  0.17  60 
OECD countries   0.002 1  0.005  7  0.2  212 
Note: Predicted probabilities are from the multinomial logit model with outcomes riots, coups and civil war.  Coups 
include both successful and attempted events.  About 50% of coups are successful.  
 Table 4 
Economic Growth and the Role of Violence, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Democracy 
Cross-country panel data consisting of non-overlapping 5-year averages spanning 1970-2000
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP p r capit e a 
Estimation method: GMM-IV system estimator 
Variable  [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Standard Control Variables 
Initial GDP per Capita  -0.0203 **  -0.0258 ** -0.0231 ** -0.0253 **  -0.1806  ** -0.0137 **
( in logs)  -8.3960 -9.0549 -8.8068 -7.6389 -13.7665 -4.7976
Initial GDP per Cap ta  i
Cyclical Component 
-0.1656 **  -0.1649 ** -0.1639 ** -0.1631 **  -0.1806  ** -0.1876 **
-14.2273 -14.8897 -13.0319 -14.3485 -13.7665 -15.4582
Inflation  -0.0165 **  -0.0217 ** -0.0173 ** -0.0208 **  -0.0226  ** -0.0228 **
( Log of Inflation + 100)  -8.0507 -13.0093 -7.5745 -11.8699 -10.4249 -10.6693
Government Expenditure/ GDP  -0.0344 **  -0.0347 ** -0.0328 ** -0.0318 **  -0.0326 
-4.9557 
** -0.0309 **
( in Logs)  -9.6700 -8.6947 -9.4830 -8.1731 -5.1438
Human Capital Investment  0.0540 **  0.0443 ** 0.0403 ** 0.0375 **  0.0210 
3.5883 
** 0.0225 **
(secondary enrollment, in logs)  9.6987 9.0971 7.0098 7.5080 3.9700
Governance  0.0178 **  0.0158 ** 0.0225 ** 0.0156 **  0.0112 
4.3630 
** 0.0120 **
(from ICRG, 0-6)  7.6480 7.2821 9.2323 6.8609 7.9926
Trade openness  0.0136 **  0.0051 0.0167 ** 0.0066 * 0.0228 
4.7746 
** 0.0164 **
(trade volume / GDP, in logs)  3.3448 1.2660 4.2579 1.8845 4.3408
Manifestation of Violence 
Probability of Riots  -0.0159 ** -0.0114 -0.0215 **
-2.2281 -1.6020 -2.9758
Probability of Coups  0.0012 -0.0063 -0.0103
0.0511 -0.2650 -0.4569
Probability of Civil War  -0.3258 ** -0.3896 **  -0.2404 **
-10.4507 -12.0612 -3.5531
Aggregate Probability of Violence  -0.0163 *  -0.0180 ** -0.0253  **
-1.8769 -2.0478 -3.7641 
Fractionalization 
Ethnic  0.0027 -0.0010 -0.0232  ** -0.0154 **
0.3212 -0.1578 -2.4243  -2.0120
Democracy 
Partial Democracy Factional  -0.0139  -0.0042
-0.6393  -0.2311
Partial Democracy Non-Factional  0.0170  0.0183 **
1.3922  2.7124
Interactions 
Ethnic Fractionalization*Partial Democracy Factional 0.0971 ** 0.0664
1.9276  1.5372
Ethnic Fractionalization*Partial Democracy Non-factional  0.0469 ** 0.0337 **
2.0902  2.6726
Period Shifts (base period: 1975-79):  -0.11926 **  0.02963 -0.06994 ** 0.04755 -0.059938 *  -0.001441
1980-84  -0.0179 **  -0.0171 ** -0.0149 ** -0.015495 **  -0.018769 ** -0.018419 **
1985-89  -0.0202 **  -0.0177 ** -0.0151 ** -0.01609 **  -0.017971 ** -0.019628 **
1990-94  -0.0256 **  -0.0212 ** -0.0207 ** -0.019657 **  -0.024363 ** -0.025479 **
1995-99  -0.0336 **  -0.0292 ** -0.0294 ** -0.026536 **  -0.034894 ** -0.034139 **
No. Countries / No. Observations  68/283 68/283 68/283 68/283 68/283  68/283
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values) 
 (a) Sargan Test  0.1520 0.1760 0.2780 0.1590 0.4320  0.453
 (b) Serial Correlation :  0.7140 0.6900 0.7320 0.6640 0.7560  0.972
       Second-Order 
Source: Authors' calculations 





  Table 5  Growth Elasticities for the Hazards of Civil Wars and Riots :
 





1970s  1980s  1990s Whole period 1970s 1980s  1990s Whole period
All Sample  -0.22  -0.81  -0.37 -0.37 -0.20 -0.77  -0.36 -0.35
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.53  -1.30  -1.36 -6.21 -0.18 -0.46  -0.56 -2.35
Other Developing Countries  -0.24  -1.18  -0.21 -0.32 -0.20 -1.20  -0.27 -0.33
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0 . 0 5 0 . 1 0 . 1 5 0 . 2 5 0 . 51 1 . 523468 1 0 1 2
α0+β0 = 0 -20% -10% -6.7% -4.0% -2.0% -1.0% -0.7% -0.5% -0.3% -0.2% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
α0+β0 = 0.05 -120% -60% -40% -24% -12% -6.0% -4.0% -3.0% -2.0% -1.5% -1.0% -0.7% -0.6% -0.4% -0.3%
α0+β0 = 0.125 -270% -135% -90% -54% -27% -14% -9.0% -6.7% -4.5% -3.4% -2.2% -1.7% -1.3% -1.1% -0.8%
α0+β0 = 0.25 -520% -260% -173% -104% -52% -26% -17% -13% -8.7% -6.5% -4.3% -3.2% -2.6% -2.1% -1.7%
1 5
 
Note: given the above parameter values, the marginal growth simulations are based on 
equation (11’):   dt
t k t dk E
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Figure 2.  Predicted probability of war onset 
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N o t e :             
Change in growth-civil wars=Beta(civil  wars)*St.Dev(civil  wars)       
Change in growth-riots=Beta(riots)*St.Dev(riots)         
where Beta(civil wars)=-0.24 and Beta(riots)=-0.02. St.Dev.(civil wars)=0.02,0.03,0.02, and 0.003 for all 
sample, SSA, Other developing, and OECD, respectively. for St.Dev.(riots)=0.17,0.14,0.17, and 0.17 all 
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Appendix A.1: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
       
Variable     Definition and Construction    Source 
Terms of Trade    The terms of trade index shows the national accounts 
exports price index divided by the imports price index. 
  World Development Indicators (2005, 
2006) and Loayza et al. (2005) 
 
GDP per capita growth     Log difference of real GDP per capita.    Authors' construction using data from 
World Development Indicators (WDI), 
The World Bank (2006). 
Initial GDP per capita    Initial value of ratio of total real GDP to total population.     Authors' construction WDI, The World 
Bank (2006). 
Initial GDP per Capita 
Cyclical Component 
  Difference between the logarithm of actual GDP per 
capita and the logarithm of potential (trend) GDP. The 
Hodrik-Prescott filter was used for the decomposition. 
  Authors' calculations using data from WDI 
(2006) 




  Ratio of government expenditures (in local currency) to 
GDP (in local currency). 
  Data come primarily from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), 2006; when 
missing, they are complemented with data 
from WDI (2006) and UN National 
Accounts Statistics (2006) 
Human Capital 
Investment 
  Ratio of total secondary enrollment, regardless of age, to 
the population of the age group that officially corresponds 
to that level of education.  
  Easterly and Sewadeh (2002), WDI (2006), 
UNESCO (2006). 
Governance    Average of three indices capturing the presence of law and 
order, lack of corruption, and accountability of public 
officials. Range is between 0 and 6. 
  International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
Political Risk Services.                   
www.icrgonline.com 
Trade Openness    Ratio of exports and imports (in local currency) to GDP 
(in local currency). 
  Data come primarily from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), 2006; when 
missing, they are complemented with data 
from WDI (2006) and UN National 
Accounts Statistics (2006) 
Real Exchange Rate 
Misalignment 
  Percentage difference between real effective exchange rate 
and its estimated equilibrium value. 
  Authors' calculations. See Appendix A.1 for 
the methodology. 
Period-specific Shifts     Time dummy variables.     Authors’ construction. 
Log lagged GDP/capita    Gdp/pop based on pwt5.6, wdi2001,cow energy data    Fearon and Laitin 2003 
Log lagged population    Log population, lagged except for first in country series    Fearon and Laitin 2003 
Oil    More then 1/2 3 of export revenue from fuel    Fearon and Laitin 2003 
Log of mountainous 
terrain    % Estimated mountainous terrain     Fearon and Laitin 2003 
Instability 
 
More than 2 points change in the polity 2 score in the last 
3 years    Fearon and Laitin 2003 
Lagged transitional       Polity IV 
and interregnum regimes       
Lagged democracy        
Lagged factional       
partial democracy       
Lagged non-factional       
partial democracy       
Lagged partial autocracy 
 
This the classification of political regimes along the lines 
of executive recruitment [Executive recruitment involves 
the ways in which superodinates come to occupy their 
positions (Polity IV manual pp. 19)] and the 
competitiveness of competitiveness of political 
participation [The competitiveness of competitiveness of 
political participation refers to the extent to which 
alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be 
pursued in the political arena (Polity IV manual pp. 25)].     
Coups    Successful and attempted coups    Belkin and Schofer 2003 
Riots  
  Violent demonstration with more than 100 participants   
Banks;  Cross National Tine Series Data 
Archive 





        
Partially  homogenous 
  
Fearon and Laitinl ef variable; and Reynal-
Querol 2002 Qlf variable. 
      
Partially  diverse       
      
Diverse      
      
Homogenous      
 
 
Uniform (homogenous) societies have both indexes of 
language and ethnic fractionalization lower than the 25th 
percentile of the whole sample. Diverse societies have 
both indexes of language and ethnic fractionalization  
greater than the 75th percentile of the whole sample.    We 
group together societies that are fairly diverse ethically (Ef 
greater than the 25th percentile and smaller than the 75th 
percentile) and as language composition  (Qlf greater than 
the 25th percentile and smaller than the 75th percentile) 
and we label them as societies with cross-cutting 
cleavages.  Partially homogenous societies have either but 
not both of the Ef index or the Qlf index smaller than its 
respective 25th percentile.  Partially diverse countries have 
either but not both of the Ef index or the Qlf index larger 
than its respective 75th percentile.    
Ethnic dominance 
 
The largest ethnic / religious group is between 45 and 90 
percent of the population    Fearon and Laitin 2003 




1970-74  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
 A
Algeria  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Argentina  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Australia  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Austria  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Bolivi   ?  ? ? ? ? ? a
Brazil  ? ? ? ?
Cameroon  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Canada  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Chile ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Colombia  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
?  Costa Rica ? ? ? ? ?
Cote d'Ivoire  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Democratic Republic f the Congo  ?   o
Dominican Republic 
? ? ? ? ?
?  ? ? ? ? ?
?  Ecuador ? ? ? ? ?
Egypt  ? ? ? ? ?
El Salv dor  a
Finland 
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
France  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Gabon  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Greece  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Guatemala
Honduras 
? ? ? ?
?  ? ? ? ? ?
India  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Indonesia  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Iran  ? ? ? ? ?
Isra   el
Italy 
? ? ? ?
?  ? ? ? ?
Jamaica  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Japan  ? ? ? ?
Jordan  ? ? ? ?
Kenya  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Korea  ? ? ? ?
Malays   ?  ia
Malawi 
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
Mali  ? ? ?
Mexico  ? ? ? ?
Morocco  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Mozambique  ? ? ?
New Zealand  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Nicaragua  ? ? ? ?
Niger  ? ? ?
Nigeria  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Norway  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Pakistan  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Panama  ? ? ? ?
Papua New Guinea  ? ? ? ?
Paraguay  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Peru  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Philipines  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Portugal ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Sierra Leone  ? ? ?
South Africa  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Spain  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Sri Lanka  ? ? ? ? ?
Sudan  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Sweden  ? ? ? ?
Switzerland  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Syria  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Thailand  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Tunisia  ? ? ? ?
Turkey  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Uganda  ? ? ?
United Kingdom  ? ? ? ?
United States  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Venezuela  ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Zambia  ? ? ?
Zimbabwe  ? ? ?
Note: 
  Checkmarks indicate that the country-period combination is included in the growth regressions.
ppendix Table A.2 : Country and Period Coverage  
Appendix Figure A.3: Democracy; Anocracy; Autocracy 
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(6) Ascription + 
Election 























Note:  Based on Executive Recruitment (EXREC) and Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP) 
variables in the Polity IV data set.  Table is from Goldstone et al. 2005.  Source: Goldstone et al. 2005.   Full 
democracies make 22% of observation in the sample.  Factional partial democracies make 11% of observations 
and non-factional partial democracies about 9 %.  Partial autocracies are about 6% of the sample.  Autocracies 
make about 48% of the observations in the sample.  Transitional regimes and irregular transfers make a little 
more than 3% of the sample.   
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